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ABSTRACT. This Note argues that rescission- the traditional remedy for innocent
misrepresentations on insurance applications -systematically overcompensates insurance
companies. In short, rescission allows insurers to refuse benefits to people who make innocent
misrepresentations and suffer losses even while retaining the premiums of similarly situated
people who never file claims. The principles of contract law do not compel this result, and courts
have made insurance law doctrine less coherent in an effort to avoid it. Given the problems that
rescission creates in the innocent misrepresentation context, this Note proposes an alternative
remedy called "actuarially fair reformation." Actuarially fair reformation would avoid rescission's
market-distorting inefficiencies by awarding misrepresenting insureds the amount of insurance
that their premiums could have financed.
AUTHO R. Yale Law School, J.D. 2oo; Yale College, B.A. 2006. Thanks to Erin Barnes,
Stephen Gilstrap, Mark Shawhan, and Alexander Stremitzer for their insightful comments on
various drafts of this Note. I owe a special debt to George Priest, who supervised this project and




1. RESCISSION: A SUPERCOMPENSATORY REMEDY OBSERVED 332
A. What Is an Innocent Misrepresentation? 332
B. Rescission as a Supercompensatory Remedy 335
C. Rescission in Action: A Case Study 337
D. Rescission as an Incentive To Engage in Bad-Faith Underwriting 339
II. RESCISSION'S SHAKY FOOTING IN CONTRACT LAW 341
A. Restoring the Parties' Ex Ante Positions 343
B. Protecting the Insurer's Freedom of Contract 348
III. INSURERS' DEFENSES AND THE INEVITABLE INEFFICIENCY OF
RESCISSION'S BINARY CHOICE 351
A. Defining Rescission's Limits 352
1. Construction of Warranties as Representations 353
2. Heightened Risk of Loss Requirements 353
3. Categorical Statutory Bars to Insurer Recovery 355
4. Imputation of Knowledge of the Insured's Misstatement 356
B. Rescission's Limits Are Inefficient 356
IV. "ACTUARIALLY FAIR REFORMATION" AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
RESCISSION 357
A. The Alternative Remedy Explained 358
B. The Merits of a Middle Way 359
1. Efficiency 360
2. Doctrinal Coherence 361
C. Actuarially Fair Reformation as a Workable Judicial Standard 362
CONCLUSION 365
329
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
Equity abhors a forfeiture,' yet in most states the law approves a forfeiture
when someone makes an innocent misrepresentation on his insurance
application. In such cases courts usually rescind the insurance contract at the
option of the insurer. Thus, an insured can answer the questions on his
application in good faith, faithfully pay his premiums, and act in reliance on
the validity of the insurance contract only to discover after suffering a loss that
he is not insured after all. This is a harsh result.
Rescission's severity is as obvious to insurance scholars as it is to anyone
else,' so it is surprising that no one has undertaken a comprehensive critique of
the traditional remedy. The dearth of scholarship on this subject is all the more
surprising given that misrepresentations are "the most litigated issue in life
insurance"' and are extremely important to other types of insurance as well.4
This Note aims to fill this gap by criticizing the use of rescission as the remedy
for innocent misrepresentations and proposing an alternative remedy called
"actuarially fair reformation." I argue that rescission is inefficient, incompatible
1. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1498, 1525 n.132 (1996).
2. See Eugene R. Anderson, Richard G. Tuttle & Susannah Crego, Draconian Forfeitures of
Insurance: Commonplace, Indefensible, and Unnecessary, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV. 825, 845 (1996);
Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in Order To Avoid
Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 585
(1999); Thomas R. Foley, Note, Insurers' Misrepresentation Defense: The Need for a Knowledge
Element, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 659 (1994).
3. 28 BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 176, at 221
(1996).
4. See KENNETH H. YORK, JOHN W. WHELAN & LEO P. MARTINEZ, GENERAL PRACTICE
INSURANCE LAw 1o8 (3d ed. 1994) (noting the frequency of misrepresentation litigation and
that in these cases "a good deal of money and important personal and public interests are at
stake"). Litigation over misrepresentations can arise for any type of insurance for which the
insurer bases its underwriting decision on the insured's application answers, although it is
especially likely in life insurance disputes where the amount in question tends to be larger.
See, e.g., Am. Fire & Indemnity Co. v. Lancaster, 415 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1969) (auto
insurance); Newman v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 154 P.2d 451 (Cal. Ct. App.
1944) (fire insurance); Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 786 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. 2003)
(health insurance); Dow Corning Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 200143, 1999 Mich. App.
LEXIS 2920, at *1, *51 (Oct. 12, 1999) (comprehensive general liability insurance). It is
possible that such litigation is less likely to arise in the health insurance context in the wake
of the recent health care reform package's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of
preexisting conditions. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,




with general principles of contract and restitution, and responsible for the
messy state of much of the relevant doctrine. Actuarially fair reformation,
which would grant the insured the amount of coverage that an insurance
company could have sold him had he told the truth, has the potential to cure
these ills.
After discussing the basics of insurance law's use of rescission in innocent
misrepresentation cases, Part I shows how insurers systematically profit from
rescission. In short, rescission allows insurers to refuse benefits to people who
make innocent misrepresentations and suffer losses even while retaining the
premiums of similarly situated people who never file claims. Rescission's
tendency to overcompensate insurers is evident from concerns that some
insurers engage in post-claim underwriting, a deliberate failure to discourage
misrepresentations that rescission makes profitable.
Part II discusses the two conceptual justifications for rescission that courts
most often offer in innocent misrepresentation cases. I argue that because
rescission systematically overcompensates insurers, it does not return either
party to its ex ante position. The insurer's right to decide with whom it will
contract similarly fails as a justification for rescission. Since the traditional
remedy requires that the insurer return some - but not all - of what it receives
from the insured, this remedy fails to unwind fully their contractual
relationship. Part III argues that rescission is responsible for much of the
doctrinal confusion surrounding misrepresentations by insurance applicants.
Courts are reluctant to deploy such a harsh remedy against sympathetic
policyholders, and the result is a body of case law that is difficult to reconcile
with the legal rules it purports to apply.
Finally, in Part IV, this Note advocates a new remedy: actuarially fair
reformation. Using this remedy, a court would award the misrepresenting
insured the amount of coverage that his premiums could have bought had he
accurately completed his application. Thus, rather than making the binary
choice between a total loss for the insured and strict enforcement of the
insurance contract as written, a court could award the insured a recovery
tailored to the degree to which his misrepresentation was material. Lest this
remedy give insurance applicants an incentive to lie, courts would need to
distinguish good-faith misrepresentations from fraudulent ones and refuse to
reform the contracts of people who intentionally deceive insurance companies.
While this asks somewhat more from courts than the approach that most states
take today, I argue that courts can distinguish good- and bad-faith
misrepresentations with enough accuracy to justify replacing rescission.
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1. RESCISSION: A SUPERCOMPENSATORY REMEDY OBSERVED
Rescission of the insurance contract is the normal remedy for
misrepresentations on an insurance application. Where an insured makes a
misrepresentation without the intent to deceive, however, rescission's
consequences often seem unduly harsh: the policyholder acts in reliance on the
existence of insurance coverage and faithfully pays his premiums only to
discover after suffering a loss that he is uninsured. The insured's comparative
fault in this scenario might justify a remedy designed to return the insurer to
the position it occupied prior to the misrepresentation, but rescission is not so
limited. Instead, the remedy allows insurers to profit from customers who
make misrepresentations but never file claims. Ongoing concerns exist about
whether insurers are doing enough to prevent misrepresentations. These
concerns strongly suggest that rescission overcompensates insurance
companies. But before making the case against rescission in greater detail, it is
first necessary to define the scope of misrepresentation cases with which this
Note is concerned.
A. What Is an Innocent Misrepresentation?
An insurance applicant makes a misrepresentation when his application
asserts "something as a fact which is untrue and affects the risk undertaken by
the insurer."' As I use the term here, a misrepresentation can be an affirmative
assertion of an untrue fact or a more passive failure to provide a complete
answer to an insurer's questions.' In either case, misrepresentations are defined
by their consequences; a misrepresentation is any communication by an
insurance applicant that induces the insurer to assess inaccurately the risk of
loss.'
Misrepresentations matter because they disrupt the underwriting process.
Underwriters use the information in insurance applications to assess the risk of
loss and assign premiums that reflect this risk. More specifically, the
underwriter's task is to set premiums at levels such that the payments of those
who do not suffer losses will produce at least enough revenue to cover the
S. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill. v. Am. Med. Sec. Inc., 38 F.3d 316, 319 (7 th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Ratcliffe v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 550 N.E.2d 1o52, 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
6. 6 LEE R. Russ & THOMAs F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 81:6. But see KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 16-19 (4th ed. 2005) (distinguishing between
cases of misrepresentation and cases of concealment and noting that concealment poses
additional scienter problems).




losses of those who do.8 Since it must rely on the truth of statements in the
application when assessing the risk of loss, misrepresentations "impair[] an
insurance company's ability to price premiums responsibly and fairly based on
the actual risk the applicant represents to the insurer."
It follows that undiscovered or unremedied misrepresentations cause the
insurer to underestimate the risk of loss and shift some of the cost of insurance
from the applicant to the insurance company. For the insurance company's
policies to remain actuarially sound, it must pass this cost on to other members
of the risk pool in the form of higher premiums. As such, an insurance policy
underwritten on the basis of misrepresentations is "an instrument of injustice
to the [insurer] and all its policy holders."'o Because they threaten both the
viability and the fairness of any insurance scheme, misrepresentations are a
special concern in insurance law.
An insured's misrepresentations may be fraudulent or innocent. Fraudulent
misrepresentations are deliberately false and designed to mislead the insurer
into issuing a policy that it either would not have issued or would have issued
at a higher premium." Such misrepresentations are an attempt to defraud the
insurance company and its policyholders. In contrast, an insured commits
innocent misrepresentation when he makes a misstatement as a result of
"ignorance, mistake, or negligence."' As in other areas of private law, the
difference between fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation in the insurance
context turns on the good faith of the misrepresenting party."
8. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 11-12 (2d ed. 2008)
("The core analytical task of an insurance enterprise is identifying future losses, choosing
which of those losses it is willing to insure, estimating their frequency and magnitude,
preparing insurance contracts that reflect those choices, and then deciding how much to
charge which classes of people in return for this protection.").
g. Gary Schuman, Misrepresentation of Smoking History in Life Insurance Applications, 3o TORT &
INS. L.J. 103, 107 (1994); see also Stipcich v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1928)
("[E]ven the most unsophisticated person must know that in answering the questionnaire
and submitting it to the insurer he is furnishing the data on the basis of which the company
will decide whether, by using a policy, it wishes to insure him.").
1o. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 237 P.2d 510, 513 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) (quoting Murphy v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 234 N.Y.S. 278, 280 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1928)).
11. See 6 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 6, § 82:21-:33.
12. See id. §§ 82:34-:39.
13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 741-45
(sth ed. 1984) (discussing how remedies available for the tort of deceit depend on scienter of
the misrepresenting party); 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.14 (rev. ed.
2002) (distinguishing between intentional and unintentional misrepresentation).
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Though the specific facts of innocent misrepresentation cases vary, most fit
into one of two scenarios: either the insured represents a fact about which he is
mistaken or he is responsible for a miscommunication with the insurer. Thus,
the insured's good-faith misrepresentations may be based on an incorrect
assumption, an undiscovered fact," or a forgotten detail. 6 In other cases the
applicant misinterprets one of the insurer's questions,'7 fails to mention a fact
that he wrongly assumes the insurance company already kIows,'" or does not
read the application with care." While the degree of the insured's culpability
varies in these scenarios, the common theme is that the insurance contract is
predicated on a misstatement, despite the applicant's good-faith attempt to
answer the insurer's questions truthfully.
Whatever the cause or extent of an innocent misrepresentation, black-letter
insurance law provides a single remedy: rescission of the insurance contract at
the option of the insurer.2 o This remedy permits the insurer to "either opt to
void the contract based upon [its] defect, or choose, instead, to waive that
defect and ratify the contract despite it."' Thus, when the insurer discovers an
innocent misrepresentation after the policyholder suffers an insured-against
loss, rescission permits the insurer to avoid paying benefits to which the
insured would be otherwise entitled. To secure the benefits of rescission in this
context, an insurer must return the insured's past premiums." This
14. See, e.g., Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 786 N.E.2d 1olo (Ill. 2003); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. of Bos., Mass. v. Adams, 107 A.2d iii (Md. 1954).
is. See, e.g., Duren v. Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 581 So. 2d 81o (Ala. 1991); Rippel v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 24 A.2d 888 (Conn. 1942).
16. See, e.g., Lamar Life Ins. Co. v. Culp, 78 S.W.2d 56 (Tenn. 1935).
17. See, e.g., Hyman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 481 F.2d 4 4 1, 443 (Sth Cit. 1973).
18. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Indem. Co. v. Lancaster, 415 F.2d 1145 (8th Cit. 1969); Newman v.
Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 154 P.2d 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944); Ryan v. Sec. Indus.
Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 939 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
ig. See, e.g., Greber v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 28 P.2d 817, 821 (Ariz. 1934); Kabban v.
Mackin, 801 P.2d 883, 887-88 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
20. See 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 10.4 (1996); 6 Russ &
SEGALLA, supra note 6, § 82:34.
21. Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004). See generally 1 BARRY R. OSTRANGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 2.07 (14 th ed. 2008) (discussing the availability of
rescission).
22. See, e.g., Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 379 (ist Cir. 1991) (observing
that in Rhode Island "the general rule is that when an insurer ventures to rescind a policy on
the basis of a material misrepresentation in the application, it must first tender to the




requirement illustrates the underlying logic of rescission. Where the insurer
opts to rescind, the insurance contract is void ab initio; it is "as if [it] had never
existed," and each party must return the other's partial performance."
B. Rescission as a Supercompensatory Remedy
Rescission overcompensates insurers in innocent misrepresentation cases
because it allows them to retain the premiums of misrepresenting insureds who
do not file claims. The result is a legal remedy that forces people who are
themselves uninsured to subsidize members of the insurance risk pool. To see
why this is so, it is first necessary to recognize that insurers almost always
discover innocent misrepresentations after the policyholder files a claim.
Both reviews of reported innocent misrepresentation cases2 and the
anecdotal experiences of practitioners" suggest that insurance companies
seldom discover innocent misrepresentations until after the insured suffers a
486 (Mont. 1942) ("There is no doubt that a party is entitled to sue and recover money
which he has paid by mistake of fact, or of mingled fact and law, and which the receiver
ought not, in equity and good conscience, to retain."); see also 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1118 (1964) (noting the general duty of an insurer to return
premiums not earned); 5 HOLMES, supra note 20, § 33.14.
23. Charles M. North, Remedies for Misrepresentation in Applications in the Presence of Fraudulent
Intent, 29 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 162, 163 (2001); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crouch,
706 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that invalidation of insurance agreement was
not an impermissible retroactive annulment of insurance where material misrepresentations
rendered agreement void ab initio).
24. My own review of innocent misrepresentation cases uncovered very few reported cases in
which the insured had not suffered some loss. See also L. William Caraccio, Comment, Void
Ab Initio: Application Fraud as Grounds for Avoiding Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance
Coverage, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 954 (1986) (making a similar observation with respect to
directors' and officers' insurance). Post-claim cases involve larger sums than their pre-claim
analogues and are therefore presumably more likely to lead to litigation. Nevertheless, the
overwhelming predominance of post-claim disputes in the case law does suggest that these
disputes are relatively more common.
25. See, e.g., F. Lane Finch, Jr., Misrepresentation in the Insurance Application, 65 ALA. LAw. 309
(2004); Stacey A. Giulianti, Strategies for Defeating the Material Misrepresentation Defense in
Insurance Actions: A Plaintiffs Perspective, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2003, at 69, 69 (discussing a
hypothetical case in which an insurer discovers misstatement after insured files claim as a
"typical factual scenario"); Thomas F. Segalla & Carrie P. Parks, Misrepresentations in
Insurance Applications: Dangers in Those Lies, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 118, 128 (2006) (discussing
claims-handling procedures as one of insurers' principal methods for handling
misrepresentations); see also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A
GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 567
(2d ed. 1988) (observing that insurers usually request rescission after an insurance buyer
suffers a significant loss).
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loss. This predominance of post-claim discoveries is in large part the result of
the tendency of filed claims to reveal new information about the insured." An
accident report may uncover the insured's true driving history,27 or arson
damage may bring to light undisclosed fire code violations. For many types of
insurance, claims filed are the only significant source of information about an
insured other than the insurance application itself." In such situations, it is
very unlikely that an insurer will discover misstatements in the application
unless the insured files a claim. As a result, in most instances "the insurance
company [does] not learn of a misrepresentation until a claim is made under a
policy."
30
This feature of misrepresentation cases, combined with rescission, enables
insurers to make an ex post decision about whether to enter into a contract
designed to allocate ex ante risk. Since the insurer knows that the policyholder
suffered a loss during the policy period when deciding whether to rescind for
misrepresentation, it is able to identify the insured as a bad bet (i.e., someone
who suffered a loss) and to refuse to underwrite his policy. In this way,
rescission does more than merely return the insurer to a position from which it
can reassess the ex ante probability of loss in light of a misrepresentation; it
allows the insurer to identify and avoid bad risks ex post.
This is important, as not every misrepresenting insured brings a claim or
suffers a loss. The insurer may not be able to underwrite insurance contracts
accurately based on misrepresentations, but this does not mean that every
applicant who makes a misrepresentation is uninsurable. Where it is not
certain ex ante that the misrepresenting insured will suffer a loss, the ex post
option to rescind allows insurers to retain the premiums of those who do not
suffer losses while withholding benefits from those who do. For this reason,
rescission systematically overcompensates the insurer by allowing it to retain
premiums paid by people it does not actually insure.
26. See Matilla v. Farmers New World Life Ins., 960 F. Supp. 223, 224 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(observing that insurers routinely investigate any claim filed within the contestability
period).
27. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Sec. Gen. Ins. CO., 211 So. 2d 477, 484-85
(1968).
28. Mitchell v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627 (Ct. App. 2005).
29. See Gary Schuman, Post-Claim Underwriting: A Life and Health Insurer's Boon or Bane, 55
FDCC Q43, 45 (2004).
30. Kathryn H. Vratil & Stacy M. Andreas, The Misrepresentation Defense in Causal Relation




C. Rescission in Action: A Case Study
The recent case of Chism v. Protective Life Insurance Co. illustrates this aspect
of the rescission remedy." In connection with their purchase of a new car in
2005, Steve and Karen Chism bought a life insurance policy from Protective
that would make the remainder of their car payments in the event of either's
death. The Chisms' car dealer, an authorized Protective insurance agent,
suggested and sold them the policy with little discussion, and the Chisms
signed the agreement without reading it."
The insurance contract also included in bold capital letters the words:
"WARNING-YOU MUST BE ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR INSURANCE.""
Elsewhere the policy explained that an applicant would be ineligible if he or she
had been diagnosed or treated in the past two years for "[a] condition, disease
or disorder of the brain, heart, lung(s), liver, kidney(s), nervous system or
circulatory system."" In fact, Steve Chism was suffering from high blood
pressure, diabetes, and peripheral vascular disease-multiple conditions that
rendered him ineligible under the express terms of the policy."
When Steve Chism died from a sudden heart attack seven months after the
Chisms purchased their car, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that Protective
could rescind the policy." The Chisms acted with "reckless disregard for the
truth" in failing to read the policy before signing it, and the absence of any
actual intent to deceive was no bar to rescission." The Chisms inadvertently
misled Protective into accepting a greater risk than it intended and, under
Kansas law, Protective was entitled to rescind the policy.
The Chisms' failure to read the insurance contract is blameworthy, and
giving Protective a remedy seems entirely appropriate. But note how
systematically granting full rescission in cases like Chism allows Protective to
profit from its customers' misstatements. No one could have predicted Steve
Chism's death with certainty at the time at which the Chisms bought their car,
and there are undoubtedly some people with Steve Chism's risk profile who do
31. 195 P.3 d 776 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 234 P-3 d 780 (Kan. 2010)
(reversing grant of summary judgment because a material issue of fact existed about
whether the alleged misstatements were caused by the Chisms or by the insurance agent).
32. Id. at 779-80.
33. Id. at 779.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 779-80.
36. Id. at 782-83.
37. Id. at 782.
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not die during the policy period. For every person like Steve Chism who
survives, Protective never discovers any misrepresentation, does not rescind the
insurance contract, and retains all premiums paid. While these surviving
insureds' premiums undoubtedly would be inadequate to pay for the losses of
those who die, they nevertheless represent a source of revenue that Protective
does not disgorge as part of the rescission remedy.
Holding Protective's profits on these life insurance policies constant,
rescission operates as a market-distorting subsidy for nonmisrepresenting
insureds. The revenue that Protective collects from people whose policies are
invalid but will never file a claim allows Protective to lower its overall
premiums, a result that redounds to the benefit of those whose insurance
policies are actually valid. This outcome is inefficient since it means that those
who do not make misrepresentations do not bear the full cost of their own
coverage; misrepresenting insureds pay a portion of everyone else's actuarially
fair premiums." To the extent that the price of insurance should force the
insured to internalize the total cost of his behavior, this type of cross-
subsidization is undesirable."
38. If innocent misrepresentations were a random event over which insurance applicants had no
control, rescission's subsidy for those who do not make misrepresentations would not
distort the insurance market. Under this assumption, an applicant has no idea whether he
has made a misrepresentation ex ante, so the ex post subsidy for those who do not make
mistakes is no reason to buy extra insurance. In this scenario, rescission is just another
characteristic of the insurance product; people buy insurance against the possibility that
they will suffer a loss without making an innocent misrepresentation. Once we relax the
assumption that the distribution of misrepresentations is random, however, cross-
subsidization begins to distort the market. To the extent that people who are more thorough
or more sophisticated are less likely to make innocent misrepresentations, they can use this
fact to capitalize on the rescission subsidy. While this phenomenon could be used to
incentivize an efficient level of caretaking by insurance applicants, Richard R.W. Brooks &
Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 25-32) (on file with the author), some applicants will be more cautious than
others. In a world of bounded rationality where few people concern themselves with the
subtleties of insurance law, not every insurance applicant is the same. As a consequence,
rescission's subsidy for nonmisrepresenting insureds is market-distorting. I am grateful to
Alexander Stremitzer for this point.
39. Schuman, supra note 29, at 46 ("One of the basic principles of insurance is that each
individual insured should pay a premium that is proportionate to the amount of risk the
company assumes for that person."). Ironically, concern over this sort of cross-subsidization
among insureds motivates many courts' decisions to provide rescission where denying the
insurer a remedy would effectively allow the misrepresenting insured to steal from other
members of the risk pool. See, e.g., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1o98, 11o8
(N.J. 1994) (explaining that ordinarily it would be against public policy "to permit a
dishonest insured to recover, [since] insurers would include the cost of that risk in




D. Rescission as an Incentive To Engage in Bad-Faith Underwriting
It is one thing to demonstrate the theoretical possibility that rescission
might overcompensate insurers and quite another to show that rescission
actually overcompensates in the real world. Indeed, it seems possible that the
transaction costs associated with investigating and litigating innocent
misrepresentation cases entirely consume the premium payments of
misrepresenting insureds who never file claims. Given the competing factors at
work, whether rescission is really a supercompensatory remedy is an empirical
question. Do insurers systematically profit from innocent misrepresentations?
A practice pejoratively known as "post-claim underwriting" suggests that they
do.4o
An insurer engages in post-claim underwriting when it does not make a
good-faith effort to assess the risk of loss at the time it issues policies but
instead "wait[s] until a claim has been filed to obtain information and make
underwriting decisions."41 An especially attractive approach for types of
policies that insure against large and infrequent losses, post-claim
underwriting is a way for insurers to profit from rescission by maximizing the
number of misrepresenting insureds whose premiums they collect, while
avoiding the costs of the normal underwriting process.42 Since the profits from
post-claim underwriting turn in part on the extent to which rescission
overcompensates insurers, the existence of this practice is evidence that
rescission is in fact supercompensatory.
insurance onto others has been a major concern from the very beginning of the law of
insurance. Richard Epstein, Do Judges Need To Know Any Economics?, 1996 N.Z. L.J. 235,
236.
40. See Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 809
(2000) (discussing the insurance industry's practice of conducting an intensive investigation
into insurability after a large claim is presented).
41. Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 186 (Miss. 1994).
42. Franklin D. Cordell, Note, The Private Mortgage Insurer's Action for Rescission for
Misrepresentation: Limiting a Potential Threat to Private Sector Participation in the Secondary
Mortgage Market, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 587, 598 (1990); see also St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med.
Ctr. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 742 P.2d 8o8, 815 n.3 (Ariz. 1987) (noting arguments that post-
claim underwriting enables insurers to "place a large number of policies at little cost and
realize high profits from the sales" with the knowledge that "the passage of time [will] root
out the bad risks"); cf Cady & Gates, supra note 40, at 827 (arguing that the insurer acts in
bad faith when it "continues to accept premiums from the insured, knowing that it will later
challenge the insured's eligibility for coverage to avoid contract performance").
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Though the prevalence of post-claim underwriting is difficult to gauge
empirically and undoubtedly varies for different types of insurance," many
insurance industry observers believe that it occurs. Numerous state supreme
courts have identified post-claim underwriting in individual cases and have
acted to restrict or ban it outright.' Anecdotal accounts of post-claim
underwriting led the House Energy and Commerce Committee to hold
hearings on the subject, 45 and similar concerns emerged during the recent
debate over health care reform.46 Post-claim underwriting has also garnered
considerable academic interest.47 Taken together, these authorities suggest that
post-claim underwriting is a real phenomenon.
43. Cf Schuman, supra note 29, at 45-48 (discussing various factors that an insurance company
considers when deciding how thoroughly to investigate an insurance applicant before
issuing him a policy).
44. See, e.g., Huff v. United Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 21, 23 (Ala. 1995) (criticizing post-claim
underwriting); Nassen v. Nat'l States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 234-36 (Iowa 1992)
(permitting expert testimony that insurer was engaged in post-claim underwriting to show
fraud by the insurer); Lewis, 637 So. 2d at 190 (holding that punitive damages are available
where insured proves insurer engaged in post-claim underwriting).
45. See Terminations of Individual Health Policies by Insurance Companies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong.




46. On Transparency in Health Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H.
Oversight & Gov't Reform Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Karen Pollitz, Research
Professor, Georgetown University Health Policy Institute); Nancy West, In a Health
Insurance Bind, Unexpectedly Uninsured, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Nov. 15, 2009,
at 1.
47. The leading academic treatments of this subject are Cady and Gates's article in the West
Virginia Law Review, supra note 40, and an older article by Robert Works. See Robert
Works, Coverage Clauses and Incontestable Statutes: The Regulation ofPost-Claim Underwriting,
1979 U. ILL. L.F. 809. Post-claim underwriting has also received cursory treatment in a
number of other scholarly works. See, e.g., Spencer L. Kimball & Bartlett A. Jackson, The
Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 141, 161 (1961) (observing that
insureds may be victims of post-claim underwriting when the insurance agent deliberately
inserts misstatements into the insurance contract without the insured's knowledge); Adam
F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26
Miss. C. L. REV. 3, 39 n.123 (20o6) (arguing that statutes requiring insurers to pay the full
insured value of property upon loss irrespective of actual market value are designed to
protect insureds from post-claim underwriting); Benjamin Schatz, Commentary, The AIDS
Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, ioo HARV. L. REv. 1782, 1785-86 (1987)
(noting the rise of post-claim underwriting of health insurance policies during the AIDS




Despite the critical role that the supercompensatory remedy of rescission
plays in post-claim underwriting, proposals to police or prohibit it have
focused on the practice's bad-faith element. Thus, some courts have held that
an insurance company is estopped from rescinding a policy where it could have
discovered the misrepresentation with minimal effort48 or where it did not act
promptly to rescind the policy upon discovery of the misrepresentation.49 Two
commentators have advocated treating evidence of post-claim underwriting as
per se bad faith and a basis for refusing to rescind insurance contracts.so
However far the law goes on this front, such efforts do nothing to resolve
the problem that makes post-claim underwriting profitable in the first place or
the ways in which rescission makes the law of insurance doctrinally
incoherent." As long as rescission systematically overcompensates insurers,
insurance companies will have an incentive to engage in post-claim
underwriting. Though courts and commentators have not realized it, worry
over this phenomenon is itself a reason to question the wisdom of insurance
law's traditional remedy for misrepresentation.
II. RESCISSION'S SHAKY FOOTING IN CONTRACT LAW
Notwithstanding rescission's tendency to overcompensate insurers, courts
and commentators often explain this remedy in the insurance context by
reference to "the rules and doctrines of contract law" that apply in cases of
mistake and misrepresentation.s2 This appeal to general principles of contract
opportunistic behavior to which the insured is vulnerable due to the sequential nature of
performance in insurance contracts).
48. 3 HOLMEs, supra note 20, 5 16.7, at 336; see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 983
F.2d 1549 (toth Cir. 1993).
49. 2 STEVEN PLITT, DANIEL MALDONADO & JOSHUA D. ROGERS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D
§ 31:98 (2010).
5o. Cady & Gates, supra note 40, at 826. Mississippi appears to take this approach. Lewis v.
Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 188 (Miss. 1994). But see Bullock v. Life Ins. Co. of
Miss., 872 So. 2d 658 (Miss. 2004) (upholding the insurer's right to rescind based solely on
post-claim investigation and implicitly calling Lewis into question).
51. See infra Parts II-III.
52. KEETON &WIDISS, supra note 25, at 571 n.16; see also Perkins v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 324
N.E. 724, 728 (Ohio 1975) (Stern, J., dissenting) ("An insurance policy is but a form of
contract."); McPhee v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 205 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Wis. 1973) ("Contracts
of insurance rest upon and are controlled by the same principles of law that are applicable to
other contracts, and parties to an insurance contract may provide such provisions as they
deem proper as long as the contract does not contravene law or public policy."); 6 Russ &
SEGALLA, supra note 6, § 81:1 (observing that insurance law's treatment of
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law is somewhat misleading in light of the special rules of construction and
statutes that apply to insurance contracts.53 Nevertheless, general contract law
provides much of the doctrinal and intellectual underpinning for insurance
law's use of rescission. Tingle v. Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. is illustrative:
The view . . . that a material representation will void the insurance
policy, regardless of the good faith of the applicant, appears to be in
line with general contract law. Sec. 164(1) of the Restatement, Second,
of Contracts, provides [that] . . . "[i]f a party's manifestation of assent
is induced by either a fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the
other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract
is voidable by the recipient."
Using [this] rule . . . in the context of an insurance policy, in order
to avoid a policy, the insurer must prove that the insured made a
fraudulent or material misrepresentation in his application . . . that
justifiably induced the issuance of the policy."
As Tingle observes, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts instructs that where
one party's material misrepresentations induce the other to enter into a
contract, the contract is voidable by the nonmisrepresenting party." This
principle is firmly established in the law of contracts.s
misrepresentations "can certainly be said to derive from the general law of contracts");
Schuman, supra note 29, at 63 ("it is a basic principle of contract law that if one party to a
contract has been led to make it by the misrepresentation of the other party, the contract is
voidable at the option of the innocent party. This principle is as applicable to insurance
policies as other contracts.").
53. See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 29 (1921) (" [W]e have taken the law
of insurance practically out of the category of contract, and we have established that the
duties of public service companies are not contractual, as the nineteenth century sought to
make them, but are instead relational . . .
54. 837 F. Supp. 191, 193 (W.D. La. 1993).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981).
56. See, e.g., Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Edwards, 45 F. Supp. 2d 722 (D. Neb. 1999); see also 27
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 5 70:29, at 298 (4th ed. 2003) ("Rescission,
as opposed to damages, may be granted for innocent as well as fraudulent
misrepresentations."); id. 5 70:31, at 302 ("[T]hough the representation may have been
made innocently, it would be unjust to allow the misrepresenting party to retain the fruits of
even an inadvertent mistake."); 7 PERILLO, supra note 13, 5 28.13, at 72 ("Where a contract
requires a party to provide information to the other, . . . a negligent misrepresentation





But neither the policies that motivate contract law's treatment of
misrepresentation nor the specific contours of this doctrine justify insurance
law's supercompensatory remedy. Insurance law's use of rescission fails to
restore the status quo ante position of either party while systematically
awarding the insurer more than its expectation damages. Although there is a
sense in which rescission vindicates insurance companies' right to decide with
whom to contract, there are good reasons to question the importance of this
type of freedom within insurance law's special regulatory framework. Contract
law and restitution do not compel but instead counsel against insurance law's
use of rescission.
A. Restoring the Parties' Ex Ante Positions
Where one party induces another to enter into an agreement by
misrepresentation, contract law offers rescission so as "to restore the parties to
status quo and therefore to prevent the misrepresenter from gaining a benefit
from the transaction."s7 Courts that deploy rescission in the insurance context
often appeal to this general contract principle, emphasizing that rescission is
designed to "restore the status quo ante" by requiring each party to return the
other's partial performance." From an ex post point of view that focuses only
57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, 5 loS, at 729.
58. Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 379 (ist Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Hailey v. Cal.
Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 8o (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining the use of rescission
in this context as an effort "'to restore both parties to their former position as far as
possible"' (quoting Neptune Soc'y Corp. v. Longanecker, 24o Cal. Rptr. 117, 124 (Ct. App.
1987))); Family Leasing & Fin., Inc. v. Infinity Ins. Co., No. CV970o6o951S, 2000 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2637, at *6 (Oct. 3, 2000) ("'The very idea of rescinding a contract implies
that what has been parted with shall be restored on both sides, and hence the general rule,
which is to be reasonably applied, . . . is that a party who wishes to rescind a contract must
place the opposite party in status quo."' (quoting Metcalfe v. Talarski, 567 A.2d 1148, 1152
(Conn. 1989))); Gonzalez v. Eagle Ins. Co., 948 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(requiring the refund of premiums in a negligent misrepresentation case because "[t]he
insurer must place the insured back in the same position the insured was in before the
effective date of the policy" (citing 9 FLA. JUR. 2D Restoration of Parties to the Status Quo §
35 (2004))); Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ill.
Ct. App. 2004) (requiring refund of premiums in a negligent misrepresentation case because
"'a party seeking rescission must restore the other party to the status quo existing at the time
the contract was made"' (quoting Int'l Ins. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 609 N.E.2d 842, 852
(Ill. Ct. App. 1993))); Mooney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 822 A.2d 567, 570 (N.H. 2003)
(arguing that rescission and the return of premiums ensures that parties "occupy the same
positions they occupied before entering into the rescinded contract" (citing Derouin v.
Granite State Realty, Inc., 459 A.2d 231 (N.H. 1983))); Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. LaCroix, 946
A.2d 1027, 1035 (N.J. 2008) ("'The object of ... rescission is to restore the parties to the
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on the individual litigants in a particular case, rescission plus the return of past
premiums does this: the insured recovers his prior payments and bears his loss
while the insurer disgorges premiums and is not responsible for the loss. These
are the positions each party would have occupied in the absence of any
contract, and, from this perspective, insurance law's use of rescission seems a
straightforward application of more general contract doctrine. Though the
logic of this approach is difficult to resist in an individual case, the aggregate
effect of rescission in all such cases fails to restore either party to its ex ante
position. The law of large numbers makes rescission inconsistent with the aims
of restitution.
To see why, it is first necessary to observe that rescission is a form of
restitution-a mechanism by which the plaintiff forces the defendant to give up
the benefits he wrongfully received from the transaction. 9 The basic function
of rescission is manifest in the requirement that one who seeks rescission
return any benefits that he received from the misrepresenting party; rescission
does not seek to punish the defendant but merely to force him to return his
profits.6o Thus, where A agrees to exchange Whiteacre for Blackacre on the
strength of B's misrepresentations, he can only rescind the contract and recover
Whiteacre if he also returns Blackacre.6' Rescission's purpose is "to return the
parties, as nearly as is practicable, to the situation in which they found
themselves before they made the contract," and the counter-restitution
status quo ante and prevent the party who is responsible for the misrepresentation from
gaining a benefit."' (quoting Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 560 A.2d 655, 662 (N.J.
1989))); Sabbagh v. ProfI & Bus. Men's Life Ins. Co., 116 N.W.2d 513, 520 (S.D. 1962)
(observing that the use of rescission in insurance cases "seeks to restore the status quo"
(citing Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1953))).
s9. See IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAw 532 (7th ed. 2008)
(explaining that rescission is a form of restitution because it involves "a dissolution or
'undoing' of the contract and a restoration of the parties to their pre-contract position"); 2
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 5 9.3(2), at 58o (2d ed. 1993) (discussing rescission in the
context of cases of innocent misrepresentations).
6o. Following the earlier restatements, a comment to the forthcoming Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment holds that "a rescinding plaintiff becomes subject to a duty
of counter-restitution with respect to any benefits received in the nullified transaction."
RESTAIEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 13 cmt. i (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2001); see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 65 (1937). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
384 cmt. a (1981) ("A party who seeks restitution of a benefit that he has conferred on the
other party is expected to return what he has received from the other party."); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 13, § os, at 730 (observing that "[t]he plaintiff must himself do equity by
restoring whatever he had received").





requirement achieves this purpose by fully unwinding the parties' contractual
relationship.
Because rescission is a form of restitution, the plaintiff cannot use it to
recover the benefit of his bargain or his reliance interest. Rather, rescission
merely returns the plaintiff to the position that he occupied before he
contracted with the defendant. As a result, plaintiffs prefer damages to
rescission in most cases." So long as performance by both parties would have
made the plaintiff better off than he was before the contract was formed, his
expectation damages will exceed the value of rescission.64 For this reason,
rescission is "a relatively mild remedy," promising to return plaintiffs to their
ex ante positions but refusing recovery of any benefits from the contract
itself.6s
Though worth less than damages in most cases, rescission will yield a
larger recovery in the subset of cases in which performance of the contract
would have made the plaintiff worse off. Where the relative value of Blackacre
declines after A exchanges it for Whiteacre, A will prefer rescission to damages.
Most jurisdictions permit rescission in such cases even though it forces the
defendant to bear a loss that his breach or misrepresentation did not cause.6
Indeed, it is in just this scenario that plaintiffs most often seek-and courts
most often award- rescission.6" Though the object of sporadic scholarly
criticism, most jurisdictions continue to permit recoveries in restitution that
exceed the plaintiffs expected returns from complete performance of the
68contract.
Why does the law deploy the otherwise mild remedy of rescission even
when it means that the defendant will have significantly less than he had ex
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 384 cmt. a (1981).
63. See RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 126 (1994)
("[T]he restitution and rescission remedies will usually leave the nonbreacher with less than
his or her expectation interest.").
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260(2) cmt. c (1958); see also 2 DOBBS, supra note 59,
§ 9.1, at 547-
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 & cmt. d (1981); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY,
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 782-83, 827-28 (4 th ed. 2001); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW
OF RESTITUTION § 3.8, at 266 (1978).
67. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 624-25 (3d ed. 2002).
68. For criticism of the still-dominant majority rule, see HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAw AND ETHICS
OF RESTITUTION 282-89 (2004); and Mark P. Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge over Troubled
Contractual Waters, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 741 (2002). See also i PALMER, supra note 66,
§ 4.4(a) at 389 (Supp. 2010) (describing this as the position held by the "overwhelming
weight of authority").
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ante? Because "the basic idea" of rescission is "to restore to [the] plaintiff
whatever [the] defendant received at [his] expense.",6  Where a contract shifts
the risk of a loss from one party to the other, rescission places this risk of loss
back on the original holder.70 Respecting the contract's allocation of risk while
rescinding its other elements would work an injustice upon the plaintiff while
allowing the defendant to "assert[] a right under the very contract which he
himself has discharged."7' In the unhappy event that a risk is realized that the
contract would have reallocated, the party that originally held the risk must
bear the loss. The logic of rescission compels this result: "[E]verything must be
returned, and the chips fall where they may."72
But this risk-shifting rationale for rescission is inapposite when the law of
large numbers limits the plaintiffs possible losses and thus limits the risk
shifted between parties. A plaintiff cannot use rescission selectively to avoid
only the unprofitable portions of a contract since partial rescission of this sort
would not return the parties to their ex ante positions.7 ' For the same reason, a
plaintiff should not be able selectively to rescind the unprofitable subset in a
series of aleatory contracts. Where multiple contracts between two parties
allocate risk, it is the overall allocation of risk that should govern the scope of
rescission. In many such situations, the only way to return the parties to their
ex ante positions would be to make rescission for all contracts a condition of
rescission for some contracts.
An example helps to illustrate this point. Consider a scenario in which A
and B bet on one thousand coin tosses by making one thousand contracts. Each
69. LAYcOCK, supra note 67, at 628. See generally Henry Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for
Breach of Contract: The Case of the Partially Performing Seller, 92 YALE L.J. 14, 29-32 (1982)
(arguing that limiting restitutionary remedies to the plaintiffs expected return from the
failed contract would be more consistent with liberal principles of freedom of contract).
70. DAGAN, supra note 68, at 284-85; see Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933)
(emphasizing contract risk allocation by observing that contract price is set "on condition
that the entire contract be performed" and should not therefore control the measure of
restitution). Since rescission is a remedy available at the plaintiffs option, it is only the risk
of loss -not the risk of gain- that rescission shifts back onto the defendant. See Andrew
Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1472, 1476, 1483-
84 (1994).
71. Philadelphia v. Tripple, 79 A. 703, 706 (Pa. 1911).
72. LAYCOCK, supra note 67, at 629.
73. For example, even if A is entitled to rescission of his transaction with B in which he
exchanged Whiteacre for Blackacre, he cannot choose to rescind only the portion of the
contract under which he was to transfer Whitcacre to B while asking a court to enforce the
portion of the contract under which B transferred Blackacre to A. Rescission obliges A to pay
full rescission to B, which means returning Blackacre. See id. at 627 ("Plaintiff cannot affirm




contract calls for A to pay one dollar to B if the coin lands on heads and B to
pay one dollar to A if the coin lands on tails. At the time they formed these
contracts, B innocently misrepresented that the coin was fair, and, on the
strength of this misrepresentation, A entered into the contracts believing that
his expected return was zero. But unbeknownst to A, in fact there was a sixty
percent probability that the coin would land on heads with each toss. After A
and B finish tossing the coin and discover B's misrepresentation, should a
court rescind the approximately six hundred contracts in which the coin landed
on heads? The law of large numbers dictates that there will be relatively little
variance in the net outcome from such a large number of coin tosses, and B's
profits will be very close to two hundred dollars -the difference between the
approximately six hundred times the coin landed on heads and the
approximately four hundred times it landed on tails. But allowing A selectively
to rescind on coin tosses that he lost would guarantee him net profits of
approximately four-hundred dollars - the total number of times the coin
landed on tails. Although rescission of any individual contract could be said to
force B to internalize the risk of heads associated with a particular toss, the net
effect of selective rescission does not restore either party's ex ante position.
For the same reason, rescission in the context of innocent
misrepresentations on insurance applications fails to return either party to the
status quo ante. Insurers profit from the selective use of rescission because they
avoid contracts in which the insured suffers a loss while retaining premiums
from contracts in which the insured does not suffer a loss. 4 Conversely, the
insured is worse off than he was ex ante since selective rescission is functionally
equivalent to giving the insurer an option to retain premiums if the insured
does not suffer a loss -an option that has economic value and that the insurer
consumes but for which the insured is uncompensated." Add this conceptual
point to the insured's obvious reliance interest in the validity of his insurance
policy"6 and it becomes clear that rescission of the insurance contract fails to
return either party to its ex ante position.
74. See supra Section I.B.
75. Rescission at the choice of the insurer operates as a put option, allowing the insurer to force
the insured to purchase insurance at the contract price after learning whether the insured
suffered a loss during the relevant period. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW 13-38 (2005).
While Ayres argues that put options are an attractive remedial alternative in a variety of
scenarios, the judicial creation of a put option clearly does not return the parties to their ex
ante positions.
76. See Works, supra note 2, at 583-84 (noting that the insured gives up not only the premium
but also the opportunity to deal with risk in some other way when he procures insurance);
Foley, supra note 2, at 662 (explaining how an insured whose policy is rescinded after he
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B. Protecting the Insurer's Freedom of Contract
A second justification for the use of rescission in innocent
misrepresentation cases is that it vindicates the insurer's right to decide to
whom it will sell insurance. Freedom of contract motivates much of the law of
contracts, and courts often treat rescission in the insurance context as a specific
application of this more general principle." One who makes a material,
unilateral mistake as a result of the other party's misrepresentations will not be
bound by the terms of a contract to which he would not have agreed. 8 In the
same way, it is argued, when the insured's misrepresentations induce the
insurer to sell him a policy for which he would not otherwise be eligible, the
insurer should not be bound. Just as an officious intermeddler cannot compel
his unwilling target to contract against his will,79 courts should not permit the
insured to force someone else to sell him an insurance policy by
suffers a loss is worse off because he is no longer able to obtain insurance on the loss or to
take precautionary measures in an effort to prevent an uninsured loss).
77. Mitchell v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 637 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Freedom of
contract and the right of an insurer to make an informed decision whether or not to insure a
given risk are strong policy considerations that support more liberal rescission rights for
misrepresentations made at the inception of the insurance contract."); Robinson v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 281 P.2d 39, 42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (observing that the
insurer has "the unquestioned right to select those whom it will insure"); U.S. Aviation
Underwriters, Inc. v. Sunray Airline, Inc., 543 So. 2d 1309, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
("[A]n insurer has a right to decide which risks it will and which it will not insure
against."); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Guzorek, 690 N.E.2d 664, 672 (Ind. 1997) (observing
that rescission "protects the insurer's right to know the full extent of the risk it undertakes
when an insurance policy is issued"); see also ioA Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 6, § 149:3, at
149-10 (observing that insurance contracts "derive their force and efficacy from the consent
of the parties"). Even when courts do not explicitly appeal to freedom of contract, it is often
implicitly at work in the application of materiality requirements. See Dorsey v. Mut. of
Omaha Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 868, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (noting that a misstatement was
material and the insurance company could avoid the contract where it "would not have
issued the exact same policy had the true facts been revealed"); Matilla v. Farmers New
World Life Ins., 960 F. Supp. 223, 225-26 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding that
misrepresentation was material because the insurer would not have issued the policy had it
known about misrepresentation); see also 3 HOLMES, supra note 20, 5 16.7, at 334-35
(observing that when an insurer seeks rescission for misrepresentation it "effectively claims
that the contract never came into effect").
78. See 13 WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1573, at 489 (3d ed. 1970) (noting
that rescission is used in unilateral mistake cases as a means of "'relieving any party who has
become bound by a contract which he never intended to make, and never would have made
but for a mistake he was laboring under in regard to a material fact"' (quoting Hester v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 268 F. Supp. 623 (D.S.C. 1967))).




misrepresenting his risk profile. On this view, the insured's misrepresentations
prevent a true meeting of the minds, and in the absence of any contract, the
insurer is not obliged to pay for the insured's losses.So
Though it is a widely accepted justification for rescission in the insurance
context, this appeal to freedom of contract is unpersuasive for two reasons.
First, it overlooks the countervailing principle that one may have a valid claim
in restitution where "the circumstances of the transaction are such as to excuse
the claimant from the necessity of basing a claim to payment on a contract."8 ,
To the extent that it creates liability in the absence of any contract, the law of
restitution subordinates the individual's right to decide whether to enter into a
particular transaction. From an ex post point of view, this means that
restitution may compel someone to be party to a transaction against his will.
Such liability is appropriate - and enhances freedom of contract from an ex
ante perspective -where it is necessary to vindicate the parties' expectations or
prevent inequitable forfeitures. People can contract more freely and at a lower
cost when they are confident that the courts will use restitution to prevent
unexpected, inequitable results.
The innocent misrepresenting insured is a good candidate for this type of
recovery in restitution because he is locked into a transaction with the insurer
so. Schuman, supra note 9, at n1o ("When the application contains a material
misrepresentation, there is no meeting of the minds and no contract results.").
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(4) (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2001); see also id. 5 2(4) cmt. c (observing that a "lack of effective consent . . . by one
or both parties, furnishes the common analytical theme uniting . . . restitution" (emphasis
omitted)); Mary Jane Morrison, I Imply What You Infer Unless You Are a Court: Reporter's
Note to Restatement (Second) of Contracts 5 19 (1980), 35 OKLA. L. REv. 707, 713 (1982)
("Whether the parties had any subjective or objective intention of contracting is irrelevant
for. .. implied-in-law cases."); Works, supra note 2, at 585 (assuming that restitution in the
insurance contract is limited to rescission and observing that "[b]ecause insurance is
aleatory, the rough equivalence between loss and benefit necessary for restitution to be an
effective protection against forfeiture simply will not be present").
82. See, e.g., Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1969) (requiring the landowner to
either pay for the building or sell the land where the contractor mistakenly constructed the
building on his land); see also Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan, 472 So. 2d 598 (La. 1985)
(permitting the plaintiff to recover the value of renovation to the defendant where the
defendant's contract to sell the building to a third party failed as a result of fraud); Farash v.
Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983) (permitting the plaintiff to recover in
restitution for the cost of renovation to the building carried out pursuant to a contract
invalidated by the statute of frauds); Bradkin v. Leverton, 257 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1970)
(allowing the plaintiff to recover against a corporate officer where the plaintiff had a
contract with the corporation entitling him to a finder's fee if the corporation used his
information).
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that rescission and return of premiums does not fully unwind." Like the
plaintiff who mistakenly constructed a building on the defendant's land in
Somerville v. Jacobs,* the misrepresenting insured confers a benefit on the
insurer that is not readily returned."s As explained above, the mere restoration
of past premiums in the event of a loss does not compensate the insured for
what is functionally the insurer's put option to force the insured to buy
insurance.86 The right to decide with whom to do business provides little
guidance when insurer and insured are trapped in an economic relationship
that a court cannot undo by simply refusing to enforce the contract. Insofar as
it allows the insurer to retain the upside risk associated with the insurance
contract, the combination of rescission and return of premiums does not cancel
the transaction; it merely changes its terms.
But even apart from the freedom-of-contract argument's dubious basis in
general principles of private law, it fails because "insurance is different.""
From the need to protect the public from misleading terms over which it
cannot bargain to concerns about insurer solvency, a variety of public policy
considerations justify insurance-specific regulations that restrict insurers'
freedom of contract." Indeed, the very existence of insurance law as a
83. See Robert H. Jerry, II, The Insurer's Right to Reimbursement ofDefense Costs, 42 ARIz. L. REv.
13, 62 (2000) (observing that rescission may not be a viable remedial alternative where it is
not possible to unwind a partly performed contract).
84. 170 S.E.2d at 805.
85. See 2 PALMER, supra note 66, § 11.5, at 5i5 (observing that where a "mistaken performance
consists of a transfer of nonreturnable goods and services . . . the remedy is in quasi contract
to recover the money value of the performance").
86. See supra Section I.B.
87. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 447 (Del. 1996).
88. For example, state law commonly regulates both insurance rates and contract terms. See,
e.g., CAL. INS. CODE 55 2070-2071 (West 2005) (prescribing standard form for fire insurance
and limiting deviations from the standard form); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11,
§§ 16o.o-i69.1 (20o6) (regulating insurance rates). See generally ERIC MILLS HOLMES &
WILLIAM F. YOUNG, REGULATION AND LITIGATION OF INSURANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 34-
41 (3d ed. 2007) (reviewing various policy considerations that justify regulation of the
insurance industry). The justification for special regulation of the insurance relationship has
received sustained scholarly attention. For two recent examples, see Susan Randall, Freedom
of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2008), which argues that heavy regulation of
insurance contracting and consumer ignorance combine to diminish the value of freedom of
contract; and Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1389 (2007), which argues that the special nature




substantive area of law distinct from contract reflects this reality."' Given the
ways in which state laws governing insurance rates and terms already
circumscribe the insurer's freedom to choose with whom to contract and on
what terms, freedom of contract provides an ill-fitting justification for
insurance law's inequitable use of rescission.
Moreover, one of the main considerations in favor of other restrictions on
insurer freedom of contract-the social desirability of risk spreading-also
serves as a reason to reject rescission's harsh consequences in innocent
misrepresentation cases. A major theme in the law of insurance is that risk
spreading is socially efficient and tends to promote distributive justice.9 o For
this reason, courts and other policymakers seek to make insurance as widely
available as possible, even at the expense of insurer freedom of contract. 91 This
same policy consideration militates against rescission in innocent
misrepresentation cases, a context in which the policyholder's very act of
attempting to procure insurance demonstrates that he would find it difficult to
bear the loss himself. As one commentator has argued, "The notion that only
those policyholders who 'follow the rules' and comply fully with policy
conditions should be covered is, in itself, inconsistent with the purpose of
insurance."" Irrespective of insurer freedom of contract, courts and legislatures
should prefer remedial alternatives that spread risk more broadly without
making the insurance markets less efficient.
Ill.INSURERS' DEFENSES AND THE INEVITABLE INEFFICIENCY OF
RESCISSION'S BINARY CHOICE
Part I demonstrated that rescission is inefficient, and Part II argued that
broader private law principles do not justify its use. This Part will show that
89. See EUGENE R. ANDERSON, JORDAN S. STANZLER & LORELIE S. MASTERS, INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 11.o6 (2d ed. Supp. 2009) ("'While an insurance policy does
represent a contractual commitment, the attitudes of the general public, the legislatures, and the
courts make clear that the insurance agreement is viewed as having broader ramifications than a
mere contract."' (quoting JAMES J. LORIMER ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF INSURANCE
37-38 (3 d ed. 1987))); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 545-49 (2d
ed. 1985).
go. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 2-4; Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made
Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1185-89
(1981).
91. See Robert H. Jerry II, Insurance, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 420, 422
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002) (noting that public policy goals are the basis for insurance
law's "override of undesirable consumer choices").
92. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 86o.
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insurance law implicitly recognizes the problems with rescission by deploying
doctrines designed to limit its use. While these doctrines deserve praise to the
extent that they prevent rescission's most extreme applications, they are no
panacea. As Part I showed, courts continue to use rescission in many situations
that allow the insurer to profit effectively from its customers'
misrepresentations. Moreover, even as courts deploy a variety of doctrines that
restrict the use of rescission, they treat rescission as the only possible remedy in
innocent misrepresentation cases. Thus, where a court denies the insurer's
request for rescission, it denies the insurer any remedy at all. The result is that
the misrepresenting insured shifts some of the cost of his risk profile onto the
insurer, who passes this cost on to other members of the risk pool in the form
of higher premiums. In this way, doctrines that restrict the availability of
rescission merely replace one inefficient outcome with another.
A. Defining Rescission's Limits
To make any sense of the doctrinal contours of a modern insurer's defense
for misrepresentation, one must begin with the old common law doctrine of
warranty.93 Under this unforgiving rule, when the insured made a statement
deemed "part of the contract," it was "presumed to be material," and its
untruthfulness was per se grounds for rescission.9 4  Nineteenth-century
insurance law distinguished warranties from "representations" - statements
"made to give information to the insurer, and otherwise induce him to enter
into the insurance contract" but not essential to the insurance contract itself.9'
Unlike warranties, the common law required an insurer seeking rescission to
show that a representation was relevant to the risk of loss. A "highly technical
doctrine" developed to guide courts in determining whether a particular
contract provision was a warranty or a representation, but the doctrine of
warranty was nevertheless thought to work "substantial injustice" in many
cases.96
Rescission plays a central role in making warranty an unduly harsh
doctrine; that the insurer's remedy constitutes a total loss for the insured leads
to warranty's extreme results. Despite rescission's significance, however,
93. See 6 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 6, S 81:o.
94. WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 1o6 (1904).
9s. Id. 5 98 (footnote omitted).
96. Id. §§ 1o6-107, at 294-95; see also ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 370
(1971) (observing that "pressure developed for amelioration of the law of warranty because





twentieth-century American insurance law developed substantive rather than
remedial solutions to the problems it creates. Even as insurance law came to
place less emphasis on the warranty/representation distinction and liberalized
the circumstances under which an insured could recover, the law retained
rescission as the insurer's only remedy. What a modern insurer must prove to
obtain rescission varies among jurisdictions. Even so, a brief survey of the most
important limitations on the use of rescission shows not only insurance law's
discomfort with the doctrine of warranty but also its failure to look for
remedial alternatives.
1. Construction of Warranties as Representations
Limits on the doctrine of warranty were among the earliest efforts to
restrict rescission's most extreme applications. A variety of state statutes
functionally have abolished warranty, either declaring all statements in an
insurance application to be representations or otherwise making rescission
under the doctrine of warranty contingent on materiality.97 In states that have
not passed such statutes, a number of judge-made doctrines help to limit
warranty's scope. For example, courts narrowly construe warranties and
strongly prefer constructions that treat them as "affirmative" rather than
"promissory."98 The modern presumption against warranty reduces the use of
rescission by increasing the number of innocent misrepresentation cases in
which courts can deploy demanding materiality requirements."
2. Heightened Risk ofLoss Requirements
Where a court treats the insured's false statement as a representation rather
than a warranty, a variety of risk-of-loss standards may apply. Some states
deploy a subjective test, requiring that the insurer show the misrepresented
information would have actually changed its decision to provide insurance or
97. 6 Russ & SEGALIA, supra note 6, § 81:51; see, e.g., E.H. Stanton Co. v. Rochester German
Underwriters' Agency, 206 F. 978 (E.D. Wash. 1913) (applying the Washington statute).
g8. That is, constructions that require that the warranty be true when the insured signs the
application but not when he files a claim. See generally KEETON, supra note 96, at 370-72
(discussing judicial techniques for limiting doctrine of warranty).
99. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: Part Two, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 1281, 1283 (1970) (arguing that courts construe warranties narrowly "so as to
minimize [their] impact").
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the premium it charged.'00 Others engage in an objective inquiry as to whether
the misrepresentation was material to the insured's risk of loss.o' A few states
permit rescission only if the misrepresentation related to the actual loss the
insured ultimately suffered."o2 State statutes commonly deploy some
combination of these standards,o3 and, in practice, state courts tend to move
freely among them. 04
Whichever standard a particular state's case law adopts, courts implicitly
consider the underlying risk of loss and balance the equities of insurer and
insured. Thus, a court's assessment of materiality will turn not only on the
extent to which the misrepresentation was relevant but also on the court's view
of the insured's blameworthiness.' Indeed, when courts apply a materiality
standard, the question is whether the insured's misrepresentation was
sufficiently important to justify rescission, not whether it was material in the
technical sense that it had some bearing on the risk of loss.' 6 The metaphysical
question of whether a particular misrepresentation "contributed to" the
insured's loss invites a similarly amorphous judicial inquiry, enabling courts to
refuse rescission in many of the cases in which it seems especially severe. '0
ioo. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/154 (West 2008) (providing for rescission where a
misrepresentation "materially affects . . . the acceptance of the risk . . . assumed by the
company"); Case v. RGA Ins. Servs., 521 S.E.2d 32, 33-34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that
misrepresentation was material where insurer would "not in good faith have issued the
policy, not have issued a policy in as large an amount at the given rate, or would not have
provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss").
ioi. See, e.g., Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Iannacchino, 950 F. Supp. 28, 31 (D. Mass. 1997); York
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 746 A.2d 906, 909 (Me. 2000); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chiu, 21
S.W.3d 232, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
102. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-418 (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.580 (West 2002); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-4-10 (2oo8); see also 28 HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 3, 5 176.02, at 246-
47-
103. 28 HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 3, § 176.02, at 239; see, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/154 (West 2oo8).
104. KEETON, supra note 96, at 385.
ios. Id. at 389 (arguing that the purpose of materiality requirements is "to disallow
unconscionable advantages to insurers" and that judicial application of the standard should
reflect its purpose); see also ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 102, at
528-30 (1987); cf 1 PALMER, supra note 66, 5 3.8, at 266 (observing that as a general matter
in the law of remedies, one way to alleviate the harsh consequences of rescission for
innocent misrepresentations is by deploying a more exacting materiality standard).
106. KEETON, supra note 96, at 381-93 (explaining why a standard that permitted rescission for
any marginal increase in the risk of loss would be unworkable).
107. See id. at 383-84 (noting ambiguity in the question of whether a particular misrepresentation




Even when they must "stretch the facts" to make use of them, these risk-of-loss
requirements provide courts with a way out when the uniform use of rescission
would yield inequitable results.os
3. Categorical Statutory Bars to Insurer Recovery
In addition to risk-of-loss requirements, many states also categorically
forbid rescission under circumstances in which rescission's effects are likely to
be especially harsh. For example, a few states permit rescission only if the
insurer can demonstrate that the insured's misrepresentation was
fraudulent.' 9 These states mitigate the practical consequences of this approach
by recognizing "equitable fraud,""o but the doctrine's function is to protect an
especially sympathetic group of insureds from the harsh consequences of
rescission.
In a similar vein, most states require that at least some types of insurance
contracts include incontestability clauses: provisions that create a short
(normally one- or two-year) statute of limitations on misrepresentation
claims."' These clauses are "a means to protect the public against untimely
denials of insurance coverage" by ensuring that one who has maintained an
insurance policy for the requisite period will not be forced to defend a
misrepresentation suit."' The breadth of incontestability clause requirements
depends on the jurisdiction, and such clauses tend to produce litigation over
whether an insurer is attempting to challenge the validity of an insurance
policy or its scope."3 Even so, the incontestability clause provides a means of
avoiding the use of rescission where the insured has an especially strong
reliance interest.
los. John Dwight Ingram, Misrepresentations in Applications for Insurance, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L.
REV. 103, lo5-o6 (2005).
iog. See 28 HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 3, § 176.03, at 251; see also Vining v. Enter. Fin. Grp.,
Inc., 148 F.3d 1206, 1215 (loth Cir. 1998) (applying Oklahoma law); Clyde A. Wilson Int'l
Investigations, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 959 F. Supp. 756, 761 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (applying
Texas law).
11o. In New Jersey, for example, a court will infer the insured's fraudulent intent from a
misrepresentation of a fact about which he could not have plausibly been mistaken. Formosa
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 398 A.2d 1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
111. 28 HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 3, § 176.01, at 233.
n2. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 845.
113. JERRY, supra note los, at 506. For a useful overview of the use and function of
incontestability clauses, see Works, supra note 47, at 809.
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4. Imputation ofKnowledge of the Insured's Misstatement
In some jurisdictions, courts can avoid rescission by imputing knowledge
of the insured's misrepresentation to the insurer. Where an insurance company
conducts an investigation prior to issuing a policy, discovers a
misrepresentation, and decides to issue the policy anyway, the company "is
deemed to have waived the misrepresentation.""' Similarly, a court may refuse
to rescind a policy where the insurer failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation after the insured's statements put it on notice of a possible
misrepresentation."' Courts are especially likely to make use of this doctrine
where they believe that the insurer is engaged in post-claim underwriting"'6 or
suspect that an insurance agent induced the insured to make a
misrepresentation.'17  By imputing knowledge of the policyholder's
misrepresentation to the insurer in such cases, courts refuse to rescind policies
that they believe the insurer should not have issued.
B. Rescission's Limits Are Inefficient
Every state observes a variety of doctrines designed to rein in rescission in
the interest of creating a more equitable body of insurance law -an end that
these doctrines attain through the exercise of judicial discretion. Ex post
assessments of the risk of loss, the insured's intent, and whether a particular
kind of loss is outside the scope of the insurance policy make many innocent
misrepresentation cases fact-driven and ad hoc." 8 Numerous commentators
114. 28 HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 3, § 176.05, at 278; see, e.g., Trawick v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 1293, 1294 ( 5th Cir. 1971).
115. Cox v. Am. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 626 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to
rescind policy for misrepresentation where applicant told insurance agent about his wife's
congenital heart condition but failed to disclose it on the application); Golden v. Nw. Mut.
Life. Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 1009 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (refusing to rescind policy
where insurance company had reason to suspect the insured had made a misrepresentation
because the company's investigation was inadequate).
116. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
117. See 28 HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 3, § 176.04, at 256-74 (discussing imputation of agent
knowledge to the insurance company).
118. See KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 25, at 569 (observing that commentators have variously
described this area of law as "'confused,' 'erroneous,' 'misleading,' and 'inconsistent"'
(citations omitted)); see also EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 339
(1935) (describing the case law as "unsettled and confused"); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance




have noted this aspect of insurance law, though few characterize it as a
consequence of rescission."' The law's failure to articulate and follow clear
legal standards surely increases litigation costs and is troubling from a rule-of-
law standpoint.
Even more troubling, however, are efforts to prevent harsh applications of
rescission by denying the insurer any remedy, which merely replace one
inefficient outcome with another. As explained in Part I, misrepresentations
shift the risk of loss from the misrepresenting insured to the insurer and,
ultimately, onto other members of the risk pool. The cost of restricting the use
of rescission is "borne by the diligent or lucky insurance buyers who do not
unintentionally misrepresent, or do not have a claim, or whose
misrepresentation is not discovered."' 2 o When a court denies an insurance
company any remedy for a material misrepresentation, the misrepresenting
insured does not internalize the full cost of his risk profile. Everyone's
insurance premiums go up as a result.m' For this reason, the various doctrines
designed to limit the use of rescission provide no solution to the basic problem.
Insurance law gives courts a binary remedial choice when efficiency demands
an intermediate result.
IV. "ACTUARIALLY FAIR REFORMATION" AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
RESCISSION
Having observed the myriad problems with rescission, the need for an
alternative is clear. This Part argues that actuarially fair reformation would
make insurance law's treatment of innocent misrepresentations more efficient
and doctrinally coherent. After explaining how courts might use actuarially fair
reformation instead of rescission, I deploy my critique of rescission to show
why this form of reformation is a better alternative.
opinions in this area are less than ordinarily enlightening about principled bases for
decision.").
usg. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 14 (noting that "[b]eginning in the 19th century, both
courts and legislatures took action that mitigated the harsh effect of warranty law in
contexts such as this"); Keeton, supra note 99, at 1294 (arguing that limits on rescission are
designed to "bar technical, immaterial defenses" from liability to the insured); Works, supra
note 2, at 590 (characterizing defenses as " [j]udicial techniques for avoiding the strict
common law rule"); Foley, supra note 2, at 663 ("[C]ourts often seem sympathetic to the
insurance buyer when it appears the insurance buyer simply made an innocent mistake and
would be treated harshly [by rescission].").
120. Ingram, supra note 1o8, at 1o6; see Schuman, supra note 9, at lo8.
121. See North, supra note 23 (developing a game theoretic model showing that the limiting
remedy for misrepresentation forces the insurer to charge higher premiums).
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A. The Alternative Remedy Explained
Courts could avoid the inefficiency and doctrinal incoherence that
rescission causes by reforming the insurance contract to award the insured the
amount of insurance his premiums could have financed. Under this approach,
a court would ask how much coverage an insurer could afford to sell someone
like the insured without shifting any of the cost of his insurance onto other
members of the risk pool. In this way, the reformation remedy would tailor the
misrepresenting insured's recovery to reflect the extent to which the
misrepresentation caused the insurer to misjudge the risk of loss. Thus, where
a misrepresentation has no impact on the ex ante risk of loss, the insured
would recover all of what he would have received under the contract as written.
Where the misrepresented fact made the insured's loss certain, the insured
would only recover his premiums.' In the many cases between these two
extremes, the court would discount the insured's recovery according to the
degree to which the misrepresentation bore on the ex ante probability of loss.'
A return to Chism v. Protective Life Insurance Co. will help illustrate how
actuarially fair reformation would work in practice. Recall that the Chism court
applied insurance law's traditional doctrinal framework for misrepresentation
cases, finding that rescission was the proper remedy because the Chisms had
inadvertently made a material misrepresentation on their insurance
application.'" In contrast to this approach, a court deploying actuarially fair
reformation would ask how much insurance Protective could have sold the
Chisms without shifting any of the cost onto other members of the risk pool.
In other words, the relevant question would be how much insurance the
Chisms could have bought with their premiums given the truth about Steve
Chism's medical condition.
While it was true in Chism that Steve Chism's health made him ineligible
for the particular policy he obtained by misrepresentation, this would not
122. Where the probability of a loss is one, the actuarially fair insurance premium is equal to the
amount of coverage. For example, $ioo of insurance coverage for a loss that has already
occurred will cost $1oo to finance.
123. The structure of this remedy is similar to proportional liability in the torts context, where
courts apportion damages according to the probability of causation. See Alexander
Stremitzer & Avraham D. Tabbach, Insolvency and Biased Standards: The Case for Proportional
Liability 4 (Yale Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 75R, 2009), available at
http://papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract id=1507871.
124. Chism v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 195 P-3d 776 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008), rev'd on other grounds,
234 P.3d 780 (Kan. 2010) (reversing grant of summary judgment because a material issue of





preclude his partial recovery under actuarially fair reformation. Rather than
asking how much insurance Protective would in fact have sold the Chisms, the
relevant inquiry would be how much insurance it could have sold them
without forcing someone else to subsidize their coverage. Irrespective of the
specific terms of the insurance that Protective underwrites, the Chisms would
recover as much insurance as their premiums could finance.
My proposal builds on the ideas of several other commentators, who have
variously advocated some form of "reformation,""' "reliance damages,"I26 or a
"substantial performance" standard' that would give courts a remedial option
between rescission and full recovery for the insured. The details of these
suggestions vary,' but their proponents all focus on the ways in which a "less
severe remedy" would allow courts to reach more equitable results in cases in
which rescission is overly harsh or unavailable.' Despite their merit, these
suggestions have failed to gain traction in the literature. Having made the case
against rescission, my aim here is to show that actuarially fair reformation
deserves a closer look.
B. The Merits ofa Middle Way
Other reformation proposals have focused on how such a remedy would
have less extreme consequences for the insured and might allow insurers to
circumvent statutory bars to rescission. 3o Though the fact that actuarially fair
reformation is a less severe alternative to rescission is without question an
important part of its appeal, the problems with rescission suggest another set
125. Vratil & Andreas, supra note 30, at 854 (advocating use of reformation to reduce the
insured's recovery where state law prevents the insurer from obtaining complete rescission
for the misrepresentation); see also Abraham, supra note go, at 1177-78 (discussing
reformation as a means of conforming insurance contracts to the insured's reasonable
expectations).
126. Keeton, supra note 99, at 1313-14.
127. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 857-59.
128. Vratil and Andreas would have courts reform the insurance contract where the insured has
committed a misrepresentation but state law prevents full rescission. Vratil & Andreas, supra
note 30, at 854. Keeton suggests permitting the insured to recover reliance damages if he can
show that if he had known his insurance contract was void he would have procured
insurance through some other means. Keeton, supra note 99, at 1313. Anderson et al. make
the proposal that is closest to the one I advocate here, suggesting that "[t]he policyholder's
payment may be reduced by an amount sufficient to compensate the insurance company for
any damage it suffers." Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 858.
129. Vratil & Andreas, supra note 30, at 854.
130. See supra Part III.
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of reasons for courts to reform insurance contracts in these cases. Actuarially
fair reformation would yield a more efficient and doctrinally coherent body of
insurance law.
1. Efficiency
The most obvious way in which actuarially fair reformation would make
insurance markets more efficient is by eliminating the Hobson's choice
between allowing the insurer to profit from its customers' misrepresentations
and permitting the insured to shift part of the cost of his coverage onto other
members of the risk pool. As explained in detail above, the choice between
rescission and no remedy at all is a choice between two suboptimal outcomes
whenever a misrepresentation induces the insurer to accept a greater risk but
not a certainty of loss."' In contrast, actuarially fair reformation would allow a
court to tailor the insured's recovery to reflect the true risk that the insurer
bore; the insured would get all of what he paid for but nothing more."'
Actuarially fair reformation would also promote efficiency by honoring the
insured's manifest desire for insurance. As a general matter, shifting risk from
a more to a less risk-averse party promotes economic efficiency, and the fact
that the policyholder attempted to procure insurance strongly suggests that he
is the more risk-averse party."' Indeed, the mere existence of an insurance
contract tends to promote "broad, diffuse, and pervasive reliance," meaning
that a voided insurance contract may itself exacerbate the degree to which the
131. See supra Sections I.B-C.
132. It is for this reason that I part with Keeton -as well as Vratil and Andreas -in advocating a
version of reformation that would not limit the insured's recovery to the amount of coverage
an insurer actually would have been willing to sell him. There is no market for some types of
insurance that would nevertheless be possible for an insurer to sell at an actuarially fair rate.
One who does not have a valid drivers' license cannot procure auto insurance, for example,
even though an unlicensed motorist is not certain to crash. In these types of situations,
reformation still outperforms rescission by preventing the insurer from profiting from the
insured's misrepresentation.
133. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90-91 (1977); see also Foley, supra note 2, at
660 (observing that "[i]nsurers are much better able than insurance buyers to spread the
risk of a loss by misrepresentation"). This is a key difference between rescission in the
insurance context and the more general model of rescission Richard Brooks and Alexander
Stremitzer develop in a forthcoming article. Brooks & Stremitzer, supra note 38, at 31.
Brooks and Stremitzer argue that the threat of rescission promotes efficiency by inducing
the parties to take an efficient level of care in fulfilling their contractual duties. Yet where
one of the parties is risk averse, the possibility of rescission could lead to overcautious




insured suffers from his loss.134 Actuarially fair reformation spreads risk by
using the premiums of misrepresenting insureds who do not suffer losses to
insure partially those who do. While not the full benefit that the
misrepresenting insured expected, actuarially fair reformation spreads risk
more effectively than rescission while still preventing insurance applicants
from shifting the cost of their insurance onto other people.
An opponent of reformation might object that, notwithstanding actuarially
fair reformation's greater remedial precision and improved risk spreading, its
more moderate penalty would make insurance applicants more likely to make
misrepresentations. Insureds are in the best position to avoid
misrepresentations, and one might reasonably worry that reformation would
cause them to take less care in their communications with the insurer."'
But even if insurance applicants knew enough about insurance law for the
change I propose to affect their behavior, actuarially fair reformation would
still incentivize an efficient level of care. Actuarially fair reformation forces
applicants to bear the full cost of their misrepresentations in the form of
reduced coverage; where an applicant induces the insurer to dramatically
misjudge the probability of loss, he would receive only a fraction of the
coverage he believed he was buying. Unlike this form of reformation, which
courts could tailor to reflect the facts of a particular case, rescission is a one-
size-fits-all remedy that is almost always supercompensatory. Because
rescission overcompensates insurers, it gives the rational insurance applicant
reason to take too much care to prevent misrepresentations."' Far from
inducing an inefficient number of misrepresentations, actuarially fair
reformation incentivizes an efficient level of care at the application stage.
2. Doctrinal Coherence
Beyond promoting efficiency, actuarially fair reformation could also bring
greater doctrinal coherence to the law of insurance. From materiality standards
to the question of whether a particular misrepresentation bore on the insured's
134. Abraham, supra note 90, at 1179 n.95. As Abraham explains, one who mistakenly believes he
has insurance will be less likely to take precautions in an effort to prevent a loss or to reserve
savings to pay for it.
135. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1978) (arguing that risk should be imposed "on the better information
bearer").
136. See CRASWELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 125 (observing that where rescission permits a
greater recovery than expectation damages, it may lead the other party to take too much care
to avoid breach).
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actual loss, courts already use a variety of doctrinal mechanisms to engage
implicitly in the kind of balancing that actuarially fair reformation makes
explicit.' The reformation remedy would allow courts to weigh the gravity of
the insured's misrepresentation openly, thus providing a more honest account
of the factors that motivate judicial decisionmaking in these cases. Rather than
framing their arguments within insurance law's formal categories, litigants
would be able to appeal directly to the factors that are already most important
to courts: was the insured's misrepresentation truly innocent, and to what
extent did it cause the insurer to misjudge the risk of loss?13" In this way,
actuarially fair reformation's straightforward approach to innocent
misrepresentation cases would tend to produce better reasoned decisions.
Actuarially fair reformation would also make insurance law better conform
to the principle that "[t]he right of a person to restitution for a benefit
conferred upon another in a transaction which is voidable for . . . mistake is
dependent upon his return ... to the other party anything which he received as
part of the transaction."' Rescission allows the insurer to retain benefits from
the insured's mistake,o but actuarially fair reformation returns both insurer
and insured to their ex ante positions. Under the reformation remedy I
propose, the insurer neither profits nor loses from the insured's
misrepresentations, and the insured receives the equivalent of the value of his
premiums in insurance coverage. To avoid its obligations under the insurance
contract, general principles of restitution hold that the insurer should return
everything of value that it took from the insured. Actuarially fair reformation
would accomplish this by forcing insurance companies to use misrepresenting
insureds' premiums to cover partially their losses.
C. Actuarially Fair Reformation as a Workable judicial Standard
Actuarially fair reformation admittedly asks more from courts than
rescission, but it nevertheless provides a workable judicial standard that courts
137. See supra Part III.
138. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text; see also KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at
567 (noting the conflict between "preserving an insurer's right to assess and accept the
actual risk or risks that are to be transferred . . . [and] protecting the expectations or the
reliance of an insured").
139. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 65
(1937); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 13 cmt.
i (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) ("[A] rescinding plaintiff becomes subject to a duty of
counter-restitution with respect to any benefits received in the nullified transaction.").




could use in practice. For courts to deploy this type of reformation, they would
need to distinguish innocent misrepresentations from fraudulent
misrepresentations as well as quantify the true ex ante risk that a
misrepresenting insured would suffer a loss. Neither of these tasks is easy, but
very similar inquiries under current doctrine suggest that courts could
accomplish them.'41 Moreover, the inefficiency of insurance law's use of a
supercompensatory remedy suggests that even an imperfectly deployed
reformation remedy would be a significant improvement over the status quo.
One of the threshold requirements for actuarially fair reformation in cases
where the insured made a misrepresentation on his insurance application
would be that the misrepresentation was made in good faith. Without such a
requirement, someone who was otherwise unable to procure insurance could
lie on his application in the hope that he could partially recover through
reformation."' The possibility that actuarially fair reformation would
incentivize insurance fraud is a legitimate concern, but it should not be
exaggerated. The remedy I propose would allow the insured to recover only the
amount of coverage his premiums could finance and only when a court
believed that the misrepresentation was made in good faith.'14 Thus, an
insurance applicant who intentionally causes the insurer to underestimate
141. See supra Subsection III.A. 3 (discussing the practice in some states of only permitting
rescission for fraudulent misrepresentations).
142. Someone for whom there is no market for insurance but who is nevertheless insurable
would be especially likely to attempt this kind of fraudulent misrepresentation. A person
who is unable to obtain a valid driver's license, for example, generally cannot buy auto
insurance even though he would not be certain to suffer a loss under the policy. See Hays v.
Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 1o5 F.3d 583, 590 (loth Cir. 1997) ("If the only consequence of a
fraudulent misrepresentation in a life insurance application is to reduce the amount paid
under the policy, there is every incentive for applicants to lie." (citing N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 923 F.2d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 1991))); Schuman, supra note 9, at 123 (expressing the
concern that "[a]llowing even a reduced recovery under policies procured [by fraud] would
reward the practice of misrepresenting facts critical to the underwriter's task").
143. Discerning when an insurance applicant has acted in good faith has not proved to be
unworkable in the states that treat applicant bad faith as a requirement for rescission. See
supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. In general, what constitutes an insurance
applicant's good faith depends on the particular line of insurance, with greater care expected
of more sophisticated applicants. Whatever the scope of the insured's duty to act in good
faith, at a minimum it would include a duty not to make knowing misrepresentations on the
application and to reveal any misrepresentations to the insurance company upon discovery.
Cf Indus. Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Perryton, 449 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) (observing that one of the purposes underlying the statutory requirement that a
certificate of health be attached to the policy delivered to the applicant is "to furnish the
insured an opportunity to correct any error which might vitiate the policy").
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greatly the risk of loss could hope to recover little more than his premiums if
his fraud was successful; nothing if it was discovered.
Actuarially fair reformation might even discourage fraudulent
misrepresentations by freeing states to ease insurers' burden of proof in such
cases, perhaps by extending the time within which insurers can raise
misrepresentation defenses.'" As I argued in Part III, state law creates obstacles
to insurers' misrepresentation claims because rescission is such an extreme
remedy. Adjusting the remedy would make it possible to moderate the
standard that insurers must meet to bring a successful claim, and the net result
might well reduce a fraudster's chances of success.
But apart from a careful analysis of insurance applicants' incentives to lie,
one should not lose sight of the basic asymmetry in the amount of relevant law
that insurers and insureds are likely to know. It is surely the case that the
typical insurance applicant is ignorant of the nuances of his state's remedy for
innocent misrepresentations, and there is thus little concern that these specifics
will induce him to commit fraud. Unlike insurance applicants, however,
insurance companies are repeat litigants in these cases. Given the companies'
greater resources and regular participation in litigation, remedial nuances are
much more likely to influence their behavior. Post-claim underwriting and
fraudulent misrepresentation are both to be discouraged, but these remedial
nuances more effectively reach the former than the latter.
A second challenge for courts applying actuarially fair reformation is that
they would need to discern how much insurance the misrepresenting insured's
premiums could have financed. To this end, courts could look to prevailing
insurance market rates - asking how much insurance the premiums would
have purchased in the absence of any misrepresentation. Courts in many
jurisdictions already consider such evidence in innocent misrepresentation
cases,145 but the comparison between insurance policies would often be
imperfect. For example, life insurance rates tend to be higher when they are
tied to the purchase of a vehicle,146 and a court would need to factor this into its
reformation of the policy in Chism. This kind of evidentiary problem would
increase the cost of litigation and enable only imprecise determinations of the
144. See supra Section III.A.
145. See 6 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 6, § 82:14-:15; Segalla & Parks, supra note 25, at 127
(noting use of "[p]roof such as underwriting guidelines, rules and regulations, [and]
underwriting manuals").
146. CRL's First Ever Report on Car Lending Practices, AM. FOR FAIRNESS IN LENDING,
http://americansforfairnessinlending.wordpress.com/2009/o6/o2/crls-first-ever-report-on





insured's proper recovery. Though such difficulties are important to consider
when evaluating the efficiency of actuarially fair reformation,14 7 my proposed
remedy might actually reduce total litigation costs by enabling courts to
abandon some of the more ad hoc and unpredictable elements of current
doctrine. In any event, the benefits of replacing a supercompensatory remedy
surely outweigh the costs.
CONCLUSION
In this Note, I have attempted to make the argument against rescission in
innocent misrepresentation cases. The Note's fundamental insight is that
rescission systematically overcompensates insurers who are the victims of
misrepresentations and that the traditional remedy thereby makes insurance
markets less efficient. The general principles of contract law do not justify this
outcome; on the contrary, restitution and the internal logic of insurance law
suggest a different result. Since state statutes govern much of the underlying
law of innocent misrepresentations, legislatures should amend these statutes to
authorize the use of actuarially fair reformation. Given rescission's long history
and codification by state legislatures, it would be improper for a court to
impose the alternative remedy that I suggest by unilateral judicial fiat. Even in
the absence of legislative action, however, courts could improve the law at the
margin by paying more attention to rescission's inefficient results.
147. Cf George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARv. L. REv. 960, 964 (1978) ("A
damage remedy entails the calculation of . . . costs-a process which requires the
expenditure of resources whether performed by a court or by the parties themselves in
settlement negotiations.").
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